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Abstract 
The research considers the influence of Choice 
(the possibility for the player to choose a gamble 
or another) and Involvement (the physical 
interaction with the gambling device) on risk 
taking in gambling games, and whether this 
influence is mediated by illusory control over the 
outcome of the gamble. Results of a laboratory 
experiment (n=100) show that (a) although 
Choice does increase illusory control, this 
influence does not translate in increased risk 
taking, and (b) whilst Involvement does increase 
risk taking, this effect is not mediated by illusory 
control. These results are discussed in relation to 
problem gambling, beliefs in the deployability of 
personal luck, and arousal approaches to risk 
taking. 
 
Choice, involvement and illusory control 3 
Active Involvement, not Illusory Control, increases Risk Taking 
in a Gambling Game 
Would you wager less money at the roulette table if the dealer placed 
your bets for you?  Would you spend less money on the slot machine if 
you could not pull the arm?  That is, do Choice and Involvement 
increase the risks we are willing to take in a gambling game?  
We define Choice as the possibility for the player to choose a gamble 
or another, rather than leaving that decision to another person (e.g., the 
dealer, the bank, another player). We define Involvement as the 
physical interaction with the gambling device, which triggers the 
(quasi-)immediate resolution of the gamble (e.g., spinning the wheel, 
throwing the dice, picking the ball from the urn).1 Choice and 
Involvement are orthogonal dimensions of the gambling experience, 
although they have often been counfounded in experimental studies. 
Remarkably, although the empirical evidence for the effects of Choice 
and Involvement on risk taking is at best mixed, and at worst flawed, 
there is a consensus that would these effects exist, they would operate 
through illusory control. 
In this article, we question this postulate and show that (a) although 
Choice does increase illusory control, this influence does not translate 
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in increased risk taking, and (b) although Involvement does increase 
risk taking, this effect is not mediated by illusory control. We first 
review the mixed empirical evidence for the links between choice, 
involvement, illusory control and risk taking in gambling games, which 
leads us to consider three potential models. We then report the results 
of a laboratory experiment testing these three models. 
Choice, Involvement, and Illusory Control in Gambling 
 
Choice and risk taking 
Prior data are inconclusive about the effect of Choice on risk taking in 
gambling games—either because of small samples, of inconsistent 
results, or because of confounds with Involvement. 
Dixon (2000) investigated risk taking in a game of roulette as a 
function of Choice. For each participant (five adult women), sequences 
of three trials with free choice (participants chose the location on the 
roulette board where they placed their bets) alternated with sequences 
of three trials with forced choice (participants gave their chips to the 
experimenter, who selected the location). Four of the five participants 
wagered a greater number of chips when they could place their bets 
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themselves. This study hints at an effect of Choice on risk taking, 
measured by the number of chips wagered; however, the small size of 
the sample makes it difficult to draw a definitive conclusion, and the 
Dixon (2000) article does not document the statistical significance of 
this effect. 
Using a dice-throwing game, Dunn and Wilson (1990) showed that 
participants who could choose their target number made larger bets 
than participants who were randomly assigned their target number. 
This effect, however, disappeared in higher-stakes games. In a study of 
computer blackjack, Chau and Phillips (1995) awarded or denied 12 
participants the ability to choose their dealer, as blackjack players are 
often found to switch to new tables after a streak of losses. This 
manipulation did not impact the size of participants’ bets. 
Gilovich and Douglas (1986) showed that bingo players increased 
the size of their bets (after a win) when they could make choices during 
the game—more precisely, when they could choose the numbers on 
their bingo cards and when they could choose which of five computer 
keys to press to generate the random number that determined whether 
any space could be filled on the card. Note that Choice here is 
confounded with Involvement, because the choice of a computer key 
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entails a physical interaction with the gambling device, which triggers 
the resolution of the gamble. 
Involvement and risk taking 
Support for the effect of Involvement on risk taking is less equivocal. 
Previous studies strongly suggest that risk taking increases with active 
Involvement. From their observations of patrons playing craps in real-
world casinos, Davis, Sundahl, and Lesbo (2000) concluded that higher 
bets were placed on patrons’ own dice rolls than on other patrons’ rolls. 
Participants in the study of Ladouceur and Mayrand (1987) played a 
game of roulette where they were either actively or passively involved 
(either they threw the ball or the dealer did). Risk taking was assessed 
through a combination of the odds chosen by participants and the raw 
amount they waged, and was influenced by Involvement. 
Chau and Phillips (1995) observed that computer blackjack players 
were likely to wager larger bets when they were playing for themselves 
(and got to press a key to draw a new card) than when they were 
betting on other players (and were passive spectators of the resolution 
of the gamble). Finally, Fernandez-Duque and Wifall (2007) presented 
participants a game in which they selected cards, one at a time, from a 
set of 10, after being instructed that nine cards won a dollar each and 
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one lost all the money and ended the game. Some participants played 
the game (which implied active Involvement with the gambling 
device), others made their decisions while observing a confederate play 
the game. Involved participants took more risks (in this case, picked up 
more cards) than non-involved participants. 
The role of illusory control 
Whether or not it is real, the effect of Choice and Involvement on risk 
taking is traditionally considered from the perspective of illusory 
control. According to Langer (1975), any condition that encourages 
participants in a game of chance to behave as if they were participating 
in a game of skill induces an illusion of personal control. Insofar as 
Choice and Involvement qualify as such conditions, it is expected that 
they will induce such an illusion, which will manifest itself in an 
inappropriate perception of one’s chances to win. In turn, this 
inappropriate perception will translate into increased risk taking. 
It seems reasonable to accept that Choice induces an illusion of 
control over the outcome of the game. Participants who can choose 
their bets likely maintain the illusion that their betting strategy can 
influence the outcome of the game. Indeed, all five participants in the 
study of Dixon, Hayes, and Ebbs (1998) decided to buy the right to 
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choose the location of their bets in a roulette game, rather than betting 
on random locations. Accordingly, lottery players have a marked 
preference for choosing their own numbers rather than having them 
chosen at random (Wohl & Enzle, 2002), especially when they score 
high on ‘desirability for control’ (Burger, 1991), and have higher 
expectations of success when they can do so. They also require more 
compensation to exchange their tickets (Langer, 1975, Exp. 2), even 
when the exchange ticket has a higher probability of winning (Langer, 
1975, Exp. 3). 
It is not clear, however, that Involvement promotes an illusion of 
control in gambling games. In particular, participants in the Ladouceur, 
Mayrand, Dussault, Letarte, and Tremblay (1984) study did not 
manifest illusory control over the outcome of the game when they 
could throw the dice themselves instead of watching the dealer do it. 
Langer (1975), Exp. 4 showed an effect of Involvement on illusory 
control, but the task was not a gamble, and had all the appearances of a 
game of skill. Langer and Roth (1975) observed an effect of 
Involvement on illusory control in a coin-tossing game, but since 
Choice was not manipulated orthogonally (and was offered to all 
participants), it is impossible to assess whether Involvement alone was 
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responsible for increased illusory control. This skepticism is reinforced 
by the results of Wortman (1975): Participants blindly drew (or 
watched someone else drew) a colored marble from a can to determine 
which consumer item they won. Drawing the marble caused an illusion 
of control only when there was foreknowledge of which marble was 
associated with which prize (i.e., only when Choice was offered to 
participants as to which prize they were aiming at). 
Finally, it has not been firmly established that illusory control 
increases risk taking in gambling games, although illusory control does 
appear to encourage risk taking in other domains (Horswill & 
McKenna, 1999). Gambling studies rarely include simultaneous 
measures of illusory control and risk taking, and when they do (Chau & 
Phillips, 1995), no causal model is tested. Previous results are thus 
inconclusive at best. In particular, May, Whelan, Meyers, and 
Steenbergh (2005) exposed participants in a roulette game to messages 
aiming at increasing or decreasing illusory control; although messages 
did influence participants’ level of irrational thinking, no significant 
difference was observed in gambling behavior. 
Summary 
Figure 1 displays the three models that seem the best candidates in light 
Choice, involvement and illusory control 10 
of previous findings. From the data we have reviewed, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Choice impacts illusory control, and this link 
is therefore featured in all the models. It also seems reasonable to 
assume that Involvement impacts risk taking, and this link is featured 
(directly or indirectly) in all the models. Now, although Choice should 
have an effect on illusory control, previous data are not clear about 
whether this effect translates into increased risk taking. And although 
Involvement should have an effect on risk taking, previous data are not 
clear about whether this effect is mediated by illusory control. 
Considering this various possibilities and constraints, we arrive at three 
potential models. 
In the Half-mediation model, both Choice and Involvement lead to 
increased risk taking, but only the effect of Choice is mediated by 
illusory control. In the Full-separation model, only Involvement has an 
(unmediated) effect on risk taking; in this model, Choice promotes 
illusory control, but this does not translate in increased risk taking. 
Finally, in the Full-mediation model, both Choice and Involvement 
lead to increased risk taking, and both effects are mediated by illusory 
control. 
To discriminate between these models, we report an experiment 
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where we independently manipulated Choice and Involvement, 
included several measures of perceived control, and assessed risk 




Participants were 100 undergraduate psychology students at the 
University of Toulouse (89 women, mean age = 21.8, SD = 3.3), 
individually recruited by a research assistant. This research assistant 
(who was blind to the objectives of the study) also performed as the 
experimenter; we will refer to her as ‘the dealer.’ 
Procedure 
Participants took the task individually. The task consisted of a series of 
gambles (in fact, six; but participants did not know exactly how many 
gambles they would play, they just knew the game would last for some 
15 minutes). Participants received an initial pool of 60 chips and were 
presented with three urns. Each urn contained 24 balls, with different 
proportions of white (winning) balls and red (losing) balls (12–12, 8–
16, and 6–18, respectively). The three urns had different payments (2 to 
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1, 3 to 1, 4 to 1) as a function of the proportion of white balls they 
contained, in order for any bet on any urn to have an expected value of 
zero (e.g., a wager of 10 chips on the third urn had an expected value of 
.25×4×10−10=0). 
Although this calculation was not explicitly shown to participants, 
each urn was clearly labelled with its proportion of winning balls and 
its payment, and no participant complained that he or she had not 
understood the payment scheme. A game turn consisted of (a) choosing 
an urn to bet on, (b) deciding on the amount of the bet, (c) drawing a 
ball from the urn, (d) possibly receiving some gains, and (e) putting 
back the ball in the urn. Participants were informed that a 20  voucher 
would be given (at random) to two of the five players finishing the 
game with the most chips. 
Design 
The game procedure depended on the experimental condition 
participants were assigned to, following a 2 × 2 between-subject design 
that manipulated Involvement (Player draws vs. Dealer draws) and 
Choice of urn (Free-choice vs. Forced-choice). In the player-draws 
condition, participants could draw the ball from the urn themselves, 
while it was a prerogative of the dealer in the dealer-draws condition. 
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In the free-choice condition, participants could freely decide during 
each turn which urn they would bet on. In the forced-choice condition, 
the dealer made this choice for them. In fact, the sequence of urns 
imposed to a participant in the forced-choice condition was determined 
by the choices made by the previous participant, who was assigned to 
the free-choice condition. Thus, the 50 sequences of choice imposed by 
the dealer in the forced-choice condition exactly matched the 50 
sequences of choice made by participants in the free-choice condition. 
Measures 
Once they had familiarized themselves with the rules, and before the 
game session began, participants answered to three preliminary 
questions, measuring illusory control: How many chips do you expect 
to have at the end of the game?  Do you think that one has better 
chances to win the voucher if one can decide oneself on the urn to bet 
on?  (yes or no) Do you think that one has better chances to win the 
voucher if one can draw the ball from the urn oneself?  (yes or no). The 
latter two questions will only be used as a supplement to the first 
question, which will be our main measure of illusory control. Our four 
measures of interest are: 
1. Expectation: The number of chips participants expect to leave 
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with at the end of the game. This is an implicit measure of their illusion 
of control. 
2. Bet: The number of chips wagered by participants, on average, 
during the six turns of play. This is a crude measure of risk taking. 
3. Investment: The ratio of the amount of chips wagered by 
participants to the amount of chips they currently have in their 
possession, on average, during the six turns of play. This is a 
more sophisticated measure of risk taking. 
4. Luck: The ratio of the numbers of white balls actually drawn to 
the number of white balls expected from chance. This measure of luck 
will be used as a covariate in some analyzes. 
The choice of the risk taking measures was dictated by a concern of 
consistency with the extent literature on gambling: Almost all the 
articles we have reviewed in the introduction use Bet as a measure of 
risk taking. Another traditional measure of risk taking would address 
the players’ preferences for low-probability gambles, but this measure 
is unavailable in the present design, because Choice is denied to half 
the players. 
As indicated by a power analysis, with N=100, a linear regression 
including three uncorrelated predictors has a satisfactory power of .80 
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to detect a small to moderate effect size (β=.25) at a significance level 
of .05 (one-tailed), assuming that the predictors and the errors from the 
regression model have a standard deviation of at most 1 (which is 
necessarily true of our Choice, Involvement, and Luck predictors, as 
well as of our Investment dependent variable). 
Results series 
The mean and standard deviations of Expectation, Bet and 
Investment in the four experimental groups are reported in Table 1. To 
test the three candidate models we identified, we performed a of 
regression analyzes (see results in Table 2 ). Note that we did not 
include the interaction term Choice × Involvement in the regression 
analyzes, for the sake of parsimony (there was no a priori theoretical 
motivation for that inclusion). We nevertheless checked that including 
the interaction term did not make any difference to the results of the 
regression analyzes. 
We first regressed the hypothesized mediator (Expectation) on the 
predictors (Choice and Involvement). Next, we regressed each of the 
dependent variables (Bet and Investment) on the predictors plus their 
covariate (Luck). Finally, we regressed each dependent variable on the 
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two predictors, the Luck covariate and the hypothesized mediator. 
Mediation is achieved when inclusion of the mediator in the regression 
significantly decreases the contribution of one or several predictors to 
the dependent variables. 
The broad picture is clear. First, illusory control (as measured by 
Expectation) increases when participants can choose the urns they bet 
on (Choice) but not when participants can draw the balls themselves 
(Involvement). 
Results related to our two additional, explicit yes/no measures of 
illusory control confirm this finding. Overall, 58 of the 100 participants 
believe that one’s chances are better if one can choose, whereas only 14 
of the 100 participants believe that one’s chances are better if one can 
draw, a large and significant difference (Z=6.1, p<.001, Cohen’s 
h=0.96). Note that whether the participants could themselves choose or 
draw (depending on the experimental group they had been assigned to 
prior to responding) did not appear to make any difference to their 
answers to these two general, hypothetical questions: A multivariate 
analysis of variance did not detect any effect of Choice, Involvement or 
their interaction on these two answers (all Fs<1, all ps>.35). 
Second, the risks participants are willing to take are impervious to 
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the Choice manipulation but not to the Involvement manipulation. 
Involvement has a reliable influence on the number of chips 
participants wager, as well as the ratio of their resources this bet 
represents. Interestingly, the Luck covariate (negatively) affects 
Investment but not Bet: It appear that participants who where lucky 
with their draws (and consequently in possession of a comparatively 
large number of chips) did not substantially increase the size of their 
bets, which mechanically decreased the proportion of their resources 
they wagered. 
Third, it is remarkably clear from Table Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable. that Expectation does not serve as a mediator for the 
effect of Involvement on Bet or Investment. Indeed, the contribution of 
Involvement to Bet and Investment is strictly the same whether or not 
Expectation is included in the regression. Furthermore, Involvement is 
not in any case a significant predictor of Expectation. Two of the 
conditions for statistical mediation are thus violated. The same 
conclusion applies to Choice: the contribution of Choice to Bet or 
Involvement is not reduced by the inclusion of Expectation in the 
regression. Furthermore, although Choice does significantly increase 
the Expectation mediator, it has no detectable effect on Bet or 
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Investment even before the mediator is included in the regression. 
Again, two of the conditions for statistical mediation are violated. 
Overall, results are entirely consistent with the full-separation 
model, and falsify both the full-mediation and the half-mediation 
models. Choice indeed has an effect on Expectation, but this effect on 
Expectation does not impact in turn Bet or Investment. On the other 
hand, Involvement does have an effect on Bet and Investment, but this 
effect is not mediated by Expectation—and in particular, Involvement 
has no detectable effect on Expectation. 
General Discussion 
Participants in our experimental gambling game played differently 
and had different expectations depending on whether they could choose 
the location of their bets, and whether they were actively involved in 
the mechanistic resolution of the gamble. Players who could choose the 
location of their bets expected to fare better than those who could not, 
but did not take larger risks. Players who could draw the balls from the 
urns took larger risks than those who could not, but did not expect to 
fare better. In other terms, a clear separation was observed between the 
effects of Choice (which impacted illusory control) and Involvement 
(which impacted risk taking). 
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It might come as a surprise that the effect of Choice is limited to 
illusory control, and does not extend to risk taking, especially since 
illusory control has been shown to play a role in problem gambling 
(Ginakis & Ohtsuka, 2005). We do not see however any contradiction 
between our results and the conception according to which illusory 
control is a key aspect of pathological gambling. Illusory control can 
influence gambling decisions in other ways than simply increasing 
wagers. For example, illusory control can be an encouragement to 
engage in a gamble in the first place; or an encouragement to adopt 
self-destructive attitudes such as chasing, that is, persistent gambling in 
the hope of making up for a series of losses (Breen & Zuckerman, 
1999). 
One reviewer suggested that participants in the Forced Choice 
condition may have had theories ranging from a benevolent to a 
malevolent dealer, because they were not told that their forced choices 
were actually that of the previous participant. If true, this may have 
watered down the effect of Choice on risk taking, as some participants 
(those who have illusions of control about Choice and believe in a 
benevolent dealer) could have wagered more in the Forced Choice 
condition. This, however, would imply greater variance in the Forced 
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Choice group, which is not found in our data—variance is in fact 
slightly greater in the Free Choice group, both for the Bet and 
Investment variables. 
Another potential concern about our experimental design is that 
Expectation may reflect general optimism about future outcomes, over 
and above any effect of illusory control: Although perceptions of 
control imply optimism, the locus of optimism might be located outside 
illusory control. We acknowledge this possibility, but cannot think of 
any plausible reason for Choice to trigger optimism/pessimism about 
the results of the gamble that would not be due to perceptions of 
control. Furthermore, this concern is moot in the case of Involvement: 
Because Involvement does not impact Expectation, we can tentatively 
conclude that it has no effect on optimism, control-based or not. 
What is left to explain is why Involvement increases risk taking, and 
why this effect is not mediated by illusory control. In the rest of this 
discussion, we suggest that the lack of mediation by illusory control 
rules out an explanation in terms of belief in the deployability of 
personal luck, and that the effect of Involvement is best explained by 
the increased arousal it may deliver. 
Wohl and Enzle (2002) expanded on Langer’s model of illusory 
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control to include perception of personal luck as a source of illusory 
control. In a first study, they showed that letting participants choose 
themselves a scratch-and-win lottery ticket enhanced both their 
perception of personal luck and their perceived chance of winning. In 
further studies, they demonstrated that participants behaved as if luck 
was a personal quality that could be transmitted to the gambling device 
by mechanisms akin to sympathetic magic. One might then consider 
that our participants behaved as if they could ‘magically’ enhance their 
chances of winning by drawing the ball from the urn, and that this 
belief encouraged them to wager larger amounts of chips. This account, 
however, would predict an effect of Involvement on Expectation, and 
an effect of Expectation on risk taking—neither of which is detected in 
the present study. 
One reviewer suggested that the timing of the control measure might 
be responsible for the lack of an Involvement effect on illusory control. 
It could be that, unlike that of Choice (which is immediate), the effect 
of Involvement on illusory control builds up as a result of actually 
taking action, and requires measurement through out the game. We 
acknowledge that possibility, and the methodological challenge of 
finding a nonintrusive measure of illusory control that would not 
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disrupt the continuity of the gambling task. 
We believe, though, that an explanation in terms of arousal gives the 
most consistent account of our results. Gambling is physically arousing 
(Meyer et al.., 2000), and higher levels of arousal increase one’s 
inclination to accept a higher risk level; for example, aroused 
individuals are willing to pay more for lotteries and less for insurance 
(Mano, 1994). In parallel, Coventry and Norman (1998) did not 
observe any link between arousal and illusory control in a gambling 
task. Thus, our results can be readily explained by postulating that 
active involvement results in higher arousal (see also Fernandez-Duque 
& Wifall, 2007, for a similar intuition): Participants who can draw the 
balls experience higher arousal, and therefore take greater risks, but 
they do not feel greater control over the outcome of the gamble. 
Illusory control has been legitimately identified as a key aspect of 
gambling—but we should be careful in assessing both its determinants 
and its behavioral consequences. Our findings emphasize that the 
quantitative risks players are willing to take (arguably a critical feature 
of gambling) are increased by their active involvement in the 
mechanistic aspects of the gamble, independently of the illusion they 
maintain over the control they exert. Further investigations will likely 
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clarify whether this effect is due to increased arousal. 
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Notes 
 
1. Note that our notion of (active) Involvement as physical 
interaction with the gambling device is different from Langer’s (1975) 
notion of ‘passive’ involvement. Passive involvement basically consists 
of delaying the gamble, for example by postponing its resolution, or by 
giving players their lottery numbers in instalments rather than at a 
single point in time. 
 




Figure 1. Three theoretical models for the effect of Choice and 
Involvement in illusory control and risk taking in a gambling game. 
